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RISK NEUTRALITYANDTHETWO-TIER FOREIGN EXCHANGE MARKET:
EVIDENCE FROM BEL.GIUN
ABSTRACT
Most of the literature on two-tier exchange markets is built around models in which domestic policy
can exert a powerful influence on the spread between the current account exchange rate and the
capital account exchange rate. We show that if optimizing agents are risk neua1, domestic policy
has no significant influence on the spread. Our work with Belgian data suggests that a nsk neuual
specification for Belgian residents acting in the two-tier market is hard to reject, and we also find
evidence that domestic variables do not affect the Belgian spread.
RobertFlood Nancy P. Marion
International Monetary Fund Dartmouth College
Washington, D.C. 20431 Hanover, NH 03755I,Introduction
Many countries have experimented with separate exchange markets for
current account and capital account transactions as a way to deal with
possibly volatile capital flows and to insulate goods-market transactions
from capital-market disturbances.Such a regime, knowrL as a dual, or two-
tier, exchange market, has been in place in the Belgium-Luxembourg
Economic Union since 1956 and was adopted in modified form by France and
Italy during the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system.The strategy of
separating exchange market transactions by type of transaction has also
been tried periodically by other developed countries and has been recently
used by several Latin American countries. j/
There have been many theoretical studies of two-tier markets.These
range from Fleming's (1971) seminal piece to more recent work that
examines the two-tier market within an explicit utility-maximizing
framework. 2/Yet there have been practically no rigorous tests of the
theories. 3/
One reason for the absence of empirical work is the transitional
nature of most two-tier regimes.Most data sets are either too short for
time-series econometric procedures or agents' beliefs about the
temporariness of the regime build into the data elements that are very
difficult to model either in time series or in cross section.A second
j/See Lanyi (1975) for a summary of two-tier exchange markets in the
1970s and Kiguel (1988) or Dornbusch (1986) for details of the more
recently adopted regimes.
21Forexample, see Obstfeld (1986), Adams and Greenwood (1985),
Kaminsky (1987), Frenkel and Razin (1986), and Tornell (1988).
/Someempirical work has been done by Phylaktis (1988) and Gros
(1988).-2-
reasonis that the countries adopting two-tier markets are seldom among
the more sophisticated in data collection.
Belgium, however, presents neither problem.It has been operating
its two-tier exchange market for over 30 years and it has a well
developed data base.To begin checking our theories for consistency with
the data, we start by looking at the Belgian experience.While Belgium's
long and continuous experience with two-tier exchange rates may also be
contaminated by agents' beliefs in the temporariness of the regime,
particularly after the commitment to create a single European market by
1992, our a priori belief is that the level of such contamination is less
serious in a longer experience than in shorter ones.
The paper will proceed as follows.In Section II we develop an
explicit utility-maximizing model of the two-tier market.In Section III
we use Hansen's (1982) General Method of Moments estimator to explore the
adequacy of a risk neutral utility function for modeling agent's choices
in the Belgian data.In Section IV we impose theoretical restrictions on
the agent's Euler equation in light of our empirical findings.After some
simple manipulations of the amended Euler equation, the theory yields a
powerful prediction.For a small country, the spread should be invariant
with respect to domestic exogenous variables. Many standard explanatory
variables in previous theoretical work, such as Belgian fiscal, monetary
or output variables, should have no impact on the spread.Section V
compares the model's predictions with the evidence.We find empirical
support for the proposition that domestic policy and nonpolicy variables
are unimportant in explaining the spread.Section VI contains some
theoretical extensions and conclusions.-3-
II.The Model
Consider a representative agent living in a country that operates a
two-tier exchange market.In order to purchase a security denominated in
foreign currency, the agent abstains from consumption today, using the
freed resources to purchase the security at its world price converted to
domestic currency units at the capital account exchange rate.After
holding the security for one period, the interest is repatriated at the
current account rate and the principal at the capital account rate.Both
of these elements of return enable the agent to augment consumption next
period or in some future period.The agents welfare is maximized when
the marginal disutility from foregoing current consumption is equal to the
expected present value of the marginal utility of the future consumption
the agent may enjoy as a result of his asset purchase.
Let us place the agent in a very simple setting in whichthere is a
single composite consumption good and no cross-market foreignexchange
leakages.In that setting, the representative agent maximizes an
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where U(.) is the period utility function, ct is consumption in period t,
p is the subjective discount factor, and is the mathematical
expectation operator conditional on full information at time t.In
addition, 8t represents net domestic holdings of foreign currency
denominated bonds at the start of period tand X and S are respectively
the exchange rates for capital and current account transactions (domestic
currency/foreign currency).There is no a priori assumption about whether
the current account rate is pegged or not.Finally, y is domestic output,
P is the domestic price level, and i* is the nominal interest rate on
foreign currency denominated bonds.The home country is small so that it
takes the foreign interest rate as exogenous.
In each period the agent purchases an amount of bonds that will
maximize his utility.The agent's first order condition relating time t





In this section, we conjecture that Belgian agents are risk neutral
and we use Belgian data in an attempt to reject this hypothesis.Note
that if Belgian residents are risk neutral, the marginal utility of
consumption is constant across time and is known to all agents.Hence,
the marginal utility terms divide out of each side of equation (1)to
yield, with some rearrangement:
J There may be other assets in the agent's portfolio, but it would not







Theterm Z1isthe real return on foreign currency denominated assets.
Now let
p(Z-EZ)=u (3)
t+l t t+l t+l
where ut+l cannot be predicted by using any variable in the agent's
information set at time t under the hypothesis of rationalexpectations.
Hence the covariance between ut+l and any variable in the time t
information set is zero.Using equation (3) in equation (2) gives:
t+l 2t+l -1 (4)
We shall test how well equation (4) holds for Belgian annual,quarterly,
and monthly data.Our test is a test of the joint null hypothesis that
agents are risk neutral and form their expectationsrationally.
We estimate equation (4) with Hansen's Generalized Method ofMoments
(CMM), an instrumental variable technique that deliversoveridentifying
restrictions when the number of instrumental variables exceeds thenumber
of parameters to be estimated.The data we use come from the IMF's
International Financial Statistics tape dated September 1988.Annual
observations run from 1955 through 1987, quarterly observations go from
1957 through 1988 and monthly observations run from mid-1964 throughthe-6-
end of 1987.The exchange rates (francs per dollar) and interest rates
(percent) are period averages the price level, which is measured by the
Belgian consumer price index,is constructed using some intertemporal
averaging. .j/Since the model is not specific about the currency
denomination of the foreign security, we let any "foreign" variables be
proxied by U.S. variables. Hence the foreign interest rate is
represented by the U.S. T-bill rate.
We follow convention and generally choose as instrumental variables a
constant and a lagged value of the return variable or components of the
lagged return since values dated t and earlier are not correlated with the
disturbance under the null hypothesis.Precise instrument sets differ
across regressions and are reported in detail in the tables below.
Table I shows the results for the Euler equation of the risk neutral
utility function using annual data.The Euler equation is estimated for
adjacent periods.In specification (I), a constant, the lagged nominal
return and the lagged price ratio are chosen as instruments.We find that
the discount factor, p,is precisely and plausibly estimated.The
estimated value is 0.9986 with a standard error of 0.01130.The
chi-square statistic that tests the overidentifying restrictions lends
support to the risk-neutral specification.The test statistic is
x2(2)—3.1786with a probability that the overidentifying restrictions
1/Itmakes little difference to our results if end-of-period data is
substituted for period averages where available. Since end-of-period data
is not available for all series, however, we confine our report to period-
average data.
2.1Inaddition we tried letting the "foreign" country be Germany, the
U.K., or France.Treating the U.S. as the foreign country was more
favorable to one of our results and did not influence other results.We
will discuss this issue later.-7-
arenot rejected of 0.3243.Consequently, the risk neutral specification
tested in (1) seems to work well.
Specification (2) reports results when the lagged percentage change
in real government spending is added as an instrument.Here the estimated
discount factor is 1.0072 and the x2(3)statistic is 8.13 with a
probability of nonrejection of 0.105.
Suspecting that the discussions about 1992 may have altered the
perceptions of Belgian agents about the permanence of the two-tier market,
and hence contaminated some of the later observations, we truncated the
sample, making the year 1982 our last observation.Specification (3)
reports these results.The discount factor is once again precisely and
plausibly estimated.Its value is 0.9983 and its standard error is
00088.The chi-square statistic for three degrees of freedom is 6.60373,
with the probability that the risk neutral specification is unrejected at
0.1661.
We then proceeded to test the risk neutral specification using
quarterly data.The results are reported in Table 2.Because of the
additional observations obtained by moving from annual to quarterly data
we expanded the instrument set as reported in the table.The discount
factor is estimated precisely and reasonably.The estimated value is
0.9971 with a standard error of 00022.Moreover, the quarterly data does
not lead to rejection of the null hypothesis.The x2(6)— 8.49887,with a
probability of nonrejection of 0.1825.
We also tested the risk neutral specification in equation 4 using
monthly data.The results are reported in Table 3.Specification (1)
includes observations for the 1980s whereas specification (2) does not.-8-
Inboth runs the discount factor is precisely estimated.It is also
moderately plausible.The estimated discount factor should be close to
the inverse of the average real return on holding U.S.assetsover the
estimation period, and over the 1964-87 period Belgian residents earned
an cx post average real rate of return of 1.000 (see Chart 1 and
Figure 1).Neither run using monthly data leads to rejection of the null
hypothesis.Specification (1) indicates a probability of nonrejection of
0.1477 while specification (2) assigns a probability of 0.1034. /
IV.A Theory of the Two-Tter Exchange Under Risk Neutrality
Since we are unable to reject the hypothesis that Belgian agents are
risk neutral, we make the representative agent's first order condition
consistent with this hypothesis.We also proceed with three simplifying
assumptions which will be relaxed later:
(Al)There are no inter-market foreign exchange leakages.
(A2)The two-tier regime is expected to be permanent.
(A3)Purchasing power parity (PPP) holds at the current account
rateimplying t5tP where P* is the foreign price level.Under
these assumptions, the first order condition in equation (1.) becomes
1/While the risk neutral specification works well for Belgian data, a
natural question is how well a nonlinear period utility function can
explain the data.We examined a popul.ar nonlinear utility function,
constant relative risk aversion.The results of the investigation are
presented in the Appendix.Three points about the results are noteworthy.
First, the discount factor in each case is estimated precisely and
reasonably.Second, the test of the overidentifying restrictions
indicates that the probability of nonrejection of a nonlinear utility
function is between 0.18 and 0.36, so that the nonlinear specification
cannot be rejected.Third, the a parameter in the utility function is
imprecisely estimated in each case, and its point estimate is outside of
the region that implies a concave utility function.In our view, then,
the risk neutral specification is the preferred one.-9-
(1 -C1p) PEt(i/P) (5)
where inverse lag operator L1 is understood to operate on variables but
not on the information set dating on the expectation operator.We then
use (A3) again and invert (I -Lp)as in Sargent (1979) to obtain a
measure of the spread (actually one plus the spread) between the capital
account exchange rate and the current account exchange rate:
(6)
We observe that the spread depends only on foreign variables and not on
any domestic variables.Moreover, this proposition is invariant to fixing
or floating the current account rate.
According to equation (I) and (Al)-(A3), domestic variables affect
the spread through their influence on the expected product of
U'(ct+l)/U'(ct), the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution in
consumption, and the return to domestic agents from holding foreign
currency denominated securities.When we assume that agents are risk
neutral, we make the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution a
policy-invariant constant (unity) and remove the predictions of systematic
correlations between the domestic policy variables and the spread.The
theoretical work to date on two-tier markets brings domestic policy
variables to bear on the spread implicitly by influencing the above
correlation.-10 -
Theanalysis is even more stark--and more clear--when we assume in
addition that agents in the rest of the world are risk neutral as well.
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Assuming that these foreign agents are risk neutral, the familiar first
order condition at time t may be rearranged as:
(1-L1p*)p*E(1*/P*1) (7)





Equation (8) reveals the two-tier market at its most basic level.
The spread acts as a wedge, filling any taste-determined zap between the
domestic and foreign discount rates.If these discount rates are time
invariant, then so is the spread.If these discount rates are identical,
then the two exchange rates will be identical also.Note that a narrow
spread between the two exchange rates need not imply that the authorities
have been unsuccessful in partitioning the foreign exchange market.
Contrary to popular belief, a narrow spread can persist even when there
are no leakages across markets.Note also that a small difference tn-11 -
ratesof time preference across countries can generate large spreads.For
example, if p —0.95and =0.9then X/S —2.111.
Before examining how well the model predicts the determinants of the
spread, it would be useful to address the appropriateness of thethree
assumptions (Al)-(A3).
Predictions were derived assuming no cross-market foreign exchange
leakages (Al).In practice, however, some purchases and sales of foreign
bonds may be conducted using the current account exchange rate and some
repatriation of interest income may be made using the capital account
rate.Such leakages may be officially sanctioned or fraudulently
undertaken.We tried to estimate a modified Euler equation with leakages
parameterized linearly (i.e., only some fraction of the flow goes through
the appropriate exchange market).Unfortunately, we were unable to find
precise and plausible estimates for the leakage parameters and so decided
to abandon the strategy.Leakages can provide an alternative explanation
for a narrow spread.It may well be the case that intermarket leakages
are so fast and so strong that any spreads that dodevelop are usually
corrected by the end of the month.However, the data is not sampled
finely enough to test this alternative explanation. 1/
Thepredictions were also generated assuming that agents expect the
two-tier exchange market to be permanent (A2).Since the Belgian two-tier
market has been in operation for over 30 years, this assumption seems
plausible.However, there is no easy way to test whether such an
/Theproblem with conducting our estimation on data sampled more
finely than monthly is that goods prices, which enter the Euler equation,
are only sampled monthly.-12-
assumptionis warranted.In Section VI, we investigate theoretically the
implications for the spread when agents believe that the two-tier market
is temporary.
Finally, the predictions about the spread were generated by invoking
purchasing power parity (A3).We decided to introduce PPP into the
estimates of the Euler equation to check how well this assumption held up
for Belgian data.Table 4 reports the results.Unless otherwise
indicated, the U.S. consumer price index was used for the foreign price
variable.
Specification (1) in Table 4 reports the results using annual data.
The discount factor is precisely and plausibly estimated, with p 0.9890
and the standard error at 0.0076.The chi-square statistic for three
degrees of freedom is 5.8407, indicating the probability of not rejecting
the null is 0.20241.When the sample is truncated somewhat
(specification (2)) ,theresults are even better.The discount factor is
still precisely and plausibly estimated and the probability of
nonrejection rises to 0.30721.We conclude that the PPP assumption is not
unreasonable for the annual data.
Next we investigated the realism of the PPP assumption using
quarterly data.Specifications (3)-(ll) report the results.The PPP
assumption turns out to be quite unrealistic when the sample period runs
through 1988 IV.Specification (3) shows that the discount factor is
precisely and plausibly estimated, but a x2() of 19.9990 indicates only
a 0.0043 probability that the null cannot be rejected.Believing that PPP
may have been more reasonable over the Bretton Woods period of fixed
exchange rates, we chose to cut the sample off at 1971 IV.Our prior-was-13-
confirmed.Specification (4) shows that the chi square statistic is now
much lower.The probability of nonrejection has increased to 0.2155.
Specifications (5)-(l0) show what happens when the sample period is
extended beyond the Bretton Woods era.The chi square statistic increases
and the probability of nonrejection declines.
To make sure that the rising chi-squares were due to the breakdown of
PPP and not to increased sample size, the Euler equation was reestimated
with more recent observations but a sample size no different from that in
specification (4)which was based on observations during the Bretton
Woods era.In specification (11) the chi square statistic again jumps up
to x2(5) 12.65809 and the probability of nonrejection falls to 0.0540.
We conclude that the quarterly data does not support the assumption of PPP
over the entire observation period.
Finally we reestimated the Euler equation under the assumption of PPP
using monthly data.Much to our surprise, we could not reject the null.
In specification (12)the chi square statistic for five degrees of
freedom was 9.19642.The probability of nonrejection was 0.1373.
Since we are not entirely comfortable with the FF1' assumption, we
decided to pursue a different route.Suppose that instead of a single
composite consumption good there are many categories of goods.If we
assume that the period utility function is additively separable in these
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where a superscript indicates the goods category and V3-(c) is period
utility derived from good i.
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Nowif the marginal utility of consuming an additional unit of category 1
goods is constant (risk neutrality) and if commodity arbitrage holds for
category 1 goods, so that P = then equation (9) can be
manipulated into yielding an expression for the spread that is identical
to equation (6) except that now the foreign price term is the foreign
price of category 1 goods.Again we find that the spread should depend
only on foreign variables.
V.The Evidence
In this section we investigate empirically whether the model captures
characteristics of the Belgian spread.Recall the model's basic
prediction:the spread will be influenced only by foreign factors.
We examine the determinants of the Belgian spread by regressing the
spread on a set of commonly suggested Belgian policy and nonpolicy
variables as well as on the foreign variables suggested by our model.The
regression is based on quarterly data since some variables are not-15 -
availableon a more frequent basis.The estimation period runs from
1963 Ito 1988 I.Before estimating, we made stationary transformations
of the explanatory variables by putting them in one-plus-growth-rate form.
The idea was to have relatively stationary processes explaining a
relatively stationary spread.Table 5 reports the results.
Specification ()inTable S shows the regression of the spread on a
constant, one plus the growth rate of real Belgian government spending,
one plus the growth rate of real Belgian output, theU.S. interest rate,
one pl.us the U.S.inflationrate, and one plus the rate of growth of the
Belgian money supply.The regression gives support to the model.None
of the Belgian variables is significant, whereas the U.S. interest rate
is significant and has the expected sign.An increase in the U.S.
interest rate leads to an increase in the spread. 1/
Since we were concerned that the regression might be capturing a few
big changes in the U.S. interest rate in the 1980s, we decided to rerun
the regression with observations running only to 1972 I.Equation (2)
indicates that the U.S. interest rate is still a significant explanatory
variable.
Several aspects of the regressions deserve additional comment.
First, the U.S. interest rate and U.S. price term are addedseparately
since there is no reason to believe that they are driven by the sametime-
series process.Second, we settled on using the U.S. whol.esale price
j/The U.S. was chosen as the foreign country because the U.S. T-bill
rate was significant and had the expected sign in theTable S regressions.
As mentioned earlier, we also tried German, U.K. ,andFrench variables in
place of the U.S. variables but we found no significant effects of these
variables on the spread.-16-
indexin the regressions instead of a U.S.pricefor a more finely
disaggregated category of traded goods since the IFS tape does not provide
the latter and our belief was that commodity arbitrage might hold up
better for the WPI than for the GPI.Perhaps the U.S. price term might
have been significant had we used a better proxy.Third, Belgian
industrial production rather than Belgian CNP was used as an explanatory
variable since quarterly GNP figures were not available on the IFS tape.
Finally, Belgian money rather than Belgian domestic credit was used as an
independent variable because there is reason to think that domestic credit
was not an exogenous variable during the sample period.The Belgian




It is widely acknowledged that it is virtually impossible to maintain
complete separation of the two exchange markets depending on the source or
use of the foreign exchange.Nevertheless, because of analytical
complexities, the number of studies that incorporate leakages has been
quite small. j/The purpose of this extension is to investigate the
effects of intermarket leakages on the simplicity of our results.
With leakages, the agent's budget constraint needs to be modified to:
j/See Bhandari and Decaluwe (1987) and Gros (1988).-17 -
P.c .+ + (1-flS —
1 t+1
. .+ .+ (l-A)S.li*.8* . +
L t+ijt+i-1t+i-l
aX .+ (l-a)S 8*
L t+ijt+i-l
where 8isthe share of foreign securities purchased at the capital
account rate,A is the share of interest proceeds on foreign-currency
denominated security holdings repatriated at the capital account rate and
a is the share of foreign-currency denominated securities sold at the
capital account rate.Our no leakage analysis assumed 8— 1,A —0,and
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We retain the condition t — Equation (10) is now a first order
nonlinear stochastic difference equation in Xt/St, with only foreign
variables forcing the equilibrium.(Unless A —0,an explicit solution
requires solving a stochastic nonlinear difference equation, which we
avoid.)Therefore, for constant 6,A, and a the ratio Xt/St will depend
only on foreign variables but possibly in a complicated way.
Next assume that the leakage parameters depend only on the spread.
The basic point remains.Domestic variables do not affect the spread.OE
course, domestic variables could matter if they somehow influence the rate-18 -
ofleakage.Our point is not to prove that domestic variables cannot
matter.Rather it is to see how much of a two-tier market theory we can
build without attaching importance to domestic variables.
The leakages we have considered seem broad enough to encompass most
two-tier regimes in practice.For example, a regime in which all interest
income is repatriated through the capital account is obtained by setting
9 =A—a—1.This particular regime is of interest because it is often
analyzed jJ and because either it must leak or it must be temporary.The
logic of this claim is straightforward.If such a regime were without
leaks and agents believed it to be a permanent arrangement, then the
agents would realize that they would never be allowed to consume the
interest earning on their foreign assets.The agents would not pay a
positive amount for assets with a zero return and they would not price
capital account foreign exchange.
Regime Temporariness
All exchange rate regimes, indeed all government policies, are
expected by agents living under the regime to be abandoned some day when
circumstances dictate that government attention be otherwise directed.
Let us suppose that agents living under a two-tier market anticipate the
possible future demise of the regime.Suppose further, for concreteness,
that they anticipate that if the two-tier regime is abandoned the
government will adopt a uniform float.The expected return to holding
foreign-denominated assets becomes a probability-weighted average of the
two-tier market expected return and the uniform float expected return.
/ See Dornbusch (1986) and Frenkel and Razin (1986).-19 -
Theimportant point is that the return now contains the time-varying
probability of regime demise.This probability can depend on any domestic
or foreign aspects of the state.Only if the probability of a regime
switch does not depend on the domestic state will domestic variables be
unimportant in explaining the spread.Treating seriously the transitory
nature of two-tier regimes established in the l9BOs will require taking a
stand on the determinants of such probabilities.
Concluding Remarks
Most of the two-tier market literature is built around models in
which domestic policy can exert a powerful influence on the spread between
the current account exchange rate and the capital account exchange rate.
However, if optimizing agents are risk neutral (or if government policy
does not much influence the consumption stream) ,domesticpolicy has no
significant influence on the spread.Our work with Belgian data suggests
that a risk neutral specification for Belgian residents acting in the two-
tier market is hard to reject.We further find some supporting evidence
for risk neutrality when we examine the implication of risk neutrality,
namely that domestic variables should not influence the spread.
We are aware of the assertion (Cros (19BB)) that realignments of the
Belgian current account franc within the European Monetary System have had
an impact on the Belgian spread.An alternative explanation, consistent
with our work, is that these realignments were correlated with changes in
the 11.5. interest rate, and it was really the latter that influenced the
spread.
We also offer a word of caution.The Belgian experience does not
necessarily carry over to other countries, particularly developing-20 -
countries,thst impose two-tier exchsnge msrkets.We hsve no evidence on
the appropriate utility function for agents operating in these countries.
Moreover, factors such as regime temporariness, the inflation tax and
controlled access to one or both foreign exchange markets may be important
in explaining the spread in these other two-tier exchange markets.Table 1. G Estimation of Euler Equations
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1. Data Set:IFS annual,data(1955-87); 33 observations






2. Data Set:IFS annual data (1955-87); 33 observations
1.00721;SE. 0.01061;PROB 1.00000
— 8.12933;PROB0.10584
3.Data Set:IFS annual data (1955-82); 28 observations
0.99832;SE. =0.00885;PROB 1.00000




















1. Data Set:IFS quarterly data (19571 19881V); 128 observations
0.99716; S.E. =0.00222;PROB 1.00000
2(6) =8.49887;PROB0.1825Table 3.GMM Estimation of Euler Equations
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1.Data Set:IFS monthly data (January 1964-April1988)
288 observations
100079 SE —0.00123 PROB =1.00000
X2(6) 9.73778 PROB 0.1477
2.Data Set: IFS monthly data (January 1964-December1979)
174 observations
p— 1.00101 SE0.00164 PROB 1.00000











1.Data Set:IFS annual data (l95587); 33 observations
















XTable 4 (continued).GMN Estimation of Euler Equations
3.Data Set:IFS quarterly data (19571 -19881V);128 observations
0.99177 SE0.00122 PROB —1.00000
19.99904 PROB 0.0043
4.Data Set:IFS quarterly data (19571 -19711V);60 observations
=0.99]86 SE =0.00094 PROB 1.00000
x215)=3.58324PROB —0.2155







6.DataSet:IFS quarterly data (19571-19771V);84observations
= 0.99272 SE =0.00122 PROB =1.00000
= 10.87873 PROB= 0.0901
7.DataSet;IFS quarterly data (19571-19791V);
92 observations
— 0.99265 SE —0.00122 PROB 1.00000
= J2.73587 PROB— 0.0528
8.Data Set:IFS quarterly data (19571 -19811V);100 observations
=0.99257 SE0.00124PROB —1.00000
=13.10370 PROB 0.0472Table 4 (continued).CMM Estimation of Euler Equations
9.Data Set:IFS quarterly data (19571 -19831V);108 observations
=0.99266 SE 0.00128 PROB 1.00000
=14.80963 PROB =0.0273
10.Data Set:IFS quarterly data (19571 -19851V);116 observations
=0.99233 SE =0.00126 PROB =1.00000
x25= 17.48027 PROB =0.0108
11.Data Set:IFS quarterly data (19731 -19881V);60 observations
=0.98555 SE0.00206 PROB 1.00000
12.65809 PROB0.0540
12.Data Set:IFS monthly data (June 1964-87); 270 observations
=0.99749 SE = PROB 1.00000
x2i5= 9.19642 PROB =0.1373Table 5.Regressions of the Spread










(7.14363) (0.834018) (0.812183) (3.14029) (-1.57265)(-1.54900)
2. Estimationperiod 1963 II-1972I;35observations,DW 1.887,R2 —0.2186




(1.84788) (-0.203460)(-0.231851) (2.63317)(0.921802) (0.568288)
Notes:Numbers in parentheses are T-statistics.
The price ratio in the regression is the inverse of the price ratio in
the euler equation, so we would expect a negative coefficient in the
regression.
Both regressions have been corrected for first order seriel
correlation.Chart 1.
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Utility Function U(c) [/(l-a)]ct
Instruments:[l(c/P)/(c1/P1),
*
Stit-l + Xt P1
x 'p
t-l
1.Data Set:IFS annual data (1955-1987)
33 observations
p 0.81979 SE0.05890 PROB 1.00000
a—-6.60102 SE 2.41973 PROB 0.05270
x2 (2) — 5.39248 PROB —0.18189
2. Data Set:IFS annual data (1955-1982)
28 observations
p 0.84144 SE —0.14527 PROB1.00000
a —-5.39529 SE 5.52681 PROB 0.48367
x2 (2)2.35231 PROB0.36280Bibliography
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